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Abstract. The RSA public-key encryption system of Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman 
can be broken if the modulus, R say, can be factorized. However, it is still not 
known if this system can be broken without factorizing R. A version of the RSA 
scheme is presented with encryption exponent e == 3 (mod 6). For this modified 
version, the equivalence of decryption and factorization of R can be demonstrated. 
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1. Introduction 
The RSA scheme can be developed in any domain with unique factorization. Here 
we use the ring Z [OJ] of Eisenstein integers, where OJ = t( - 1 + j"=3) is a primitive 
cube root of unity. The public-key encryption system is made up of a community 
of users, each with individual encryption and decryption keys. The encryption key 
consists of a modulus R in Z[OJ] and a positive integer e, called the encryption 
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exponent. The decryption key is another integer exponent d. For each user, the 
encryption key is made publicly accessible, but the decryption key is kept secret. 
The modulus R is the product of two carefully selected large primes p and q in ZEro]. 
In addition, e must be relatively prime to cp(R) ,;" (pp - 1 )(qq - 1). With this proviso, 
d can be obtained by solving the congruence de == 1 (mod cp(R». 
The protocol for sending messages follows the usual lines. First, assign numerical 
equivalents to the symbols of the message (for example, A = 01, B = 02, ... ). If the 
resulting numerical string is very long, break it into blocks representing numbers 
no larger than 1 R I. Take the blocks in pairs and interpret the pair a, b as the 
Eisenstein integer a + bro. To send a message M, coded in this way as an element 
of Z[ro], the sender computes C == Me (mod R) using the encryption key (R, e). (As 
in Z. the congruence notation a == p (mod m) in ZEro] means that m divides a - p. 
We are working with the complete set of residues described in Section 3 below). To 
determine the plaintext M from the ciphertext C, the recipient uses the secret key 
d and calculates M == Cd (mod R). If R can be factorized, then d is easy to determine 
given Rand e. So breaking the cipher is at most as difficult as factorization. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a modified version of the RSA cryptosystem 
in ZEro]. It will be shown that breaking the system is equivalent to factorizing the 
modulus R. In what follows, R will be the product of two primes in specified 
congruence classes modulo 9 in Z[ro], so factorizing R is not quite the same as 
factorizing an arbitrary integer in Z [w]. On the other hand, there is no reason to 
believe that factorizing R is any easier than factorizing an arbitrary integer in Z [ro]. 
Williams [Wi 1], [Wi2] ~nd Rabin [R] have also proposed public-key schemes 
which are provably as intractable as factorization. The papers [Wil] and [R] take 
the encryption exponent e = 2 and [Wi2] takes e = 3. This paper provides an 
alternative approach to the case e = 3. The main difference in the description of the 
system lies in the choice of the complete set of residues used in defining the message 
space in Section 3. The choice used here has a geometrical flavour which we have 
found helpful. 
2. Arithmetic in Z [w ] 
In this section we summarize the essential facts about cubic residues in ZEro]. A 
basic reference is Chapter 9 of [IR]. 
As above, set w = t( -1 + ~). The ring ZEro] comprises all numbers of the 
form a + bw with a and b in Z, the ring of rational integers. Multiplication is easily 
performed using ro2 = - 1 - ro. For a = a + bro in Z [ro], we define the norm 
Na = aiX = a2 - ab + b2• There are six units in ZEro], namely ± 1, ±ro, ±ro2• The 
numbers a, p in Z[w] are called associates if a = pu for some unit u in ZEro]. A 
number a = a + bw is called primary if a == 2 (mod 3) and b == 0 (mod 3). Each C( in 
ZEro] with Na == 1 (mod 3) has a unique associate which is primary. In particular, 
this applies to any prime p in ZEro] with Np #- 3 because it can be shown that 
Np == 1 (mod 3). 
Let p be a prime in ZEro] with Np #- 3. A number a in ZEro] is called a cubic 
residue modulo p if a == p3 (mod p) for some p in Z[w]. Exactly one-third of the 
residue classes relatively prime to p are cubic residues modulo p and each nonzero 
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cubic residue has exactly three cube roots modulo p. Indeed, if IX =. {J3 (mod p), then 
the three cube roots of IX are {J, w{J, and w 2{J. 
Letpand q be distinct primes in Z[w] with Np, Nq 1= 3. By the Chinese remainder 
theorem, the residue classes in Z[w] modulo pq correspond to the pairs [IX, {J], 
where IX, {J run through the residue classes in Z[w] modulo p and q, respectively. 
The residue class () (mod pq) corresponds to the pair [IX, {J] if and only if () =. IX 
(mod p) and () =. {J (mod q). Consequently, if () is a cube relatively prime to pq, say 
() =. ()~ (mod pq), then () has nine cube roots modulo pq obtained by running through 
the three cube roots modulo p and the three cube roots modulo q independently. 
That is, if {)I = [IX, {J], say, the nine cube roots of () are 
{)I = [IX, {J], {)2 = [WIX, w{J], {)3 = [W21X, w 2{J], 
{)4 = [IX, w{J], {)5 = [W21X, {J], {)6 = [WIX, w 2{J], 
{)7 = [WIX, {J], 
Let p be a prime in Z[w] with Np 1= 3. For IX in Z[w], the cubic residue symbol 
is the cubic character given by . 
0 if IX =.0 (mod p), 
if IX(Np-I)/3 =. 1 (mod p), 
(lXjph = 
if IX(Np-I)/3 =. W (mod p), w 
w 2 if IX(Np-I)/3 =. w 2 (mod pl. 
This is well defined because IX Np - 1 =. I (mod pl. Moreover, IX is a cubic residue if and 
only if (lXjph = I. The definition is extended multiplicatively to any modulus R for 
which N R is not divisible by 3 as follows: if 
k 
R = n p7', 
i=1 
where the Pi are distinct primes in Z[w] and Npi 1= 3, then 
k 
(lXjRh = n (lXjpi)~'· 
i=1 
The cubic residue symbol has the properties: 
I. If IXI =. 1X2 (mod R), then (1XljRh = (1X2jRh. 
2. (IX I IX2jRh = (1XIjRh(1X2jRh. and 
3. (lXjR I R2h = (lXjR 1h(lXjR 2 h. 
whenever the symbols are defined. Further, we have the following much deeper 
4. Law of cubic reciprocity: 
a. If R = 3m - 1 + 3nw is primary, then (1 - wjRh = w 2m, (wjRh = w m +n• 
b. If R, S are primary and NR 1= NS, then (RjSh = (SjRh. 
The reciprocity law makes it easy to calculate the cubic residue symbol. Consider 
(QljQ2h, where 31 NQ2. We write Qi = (1 - W)I'UiRi' where (1 - W)I, is the exact 
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power of the prime 1 - w dividing Qi' Ui is a unit, and Ri is primary.If(Ql' Q2) :F 1, 
then (QdQ2h = O. Otherwise, since 31 NQ2' 
(QIIQ2h = (1 - wIR2)~(UIIR2h(RIIR2h 
and the first two symbols on the right are given by 4a above. Using the Euclidean 
algorithm, we can write 
Rl = klR2 + Q3' 0 < NQ3::;; *NR2, Q3 = (1 - W) '3U3R3 
R2 = k2R3 + Q4' 0 < NQ4 ::;; iNR3, Q4 = (1 - W)'4U4R4' and so on. 
Since the norms of the remainders decrease geometrically, the algorithm must 
terminate and finally we reach the statement that Qm+l' say, is a unit and Rm+l = 
- l. By the reciprocity law, 
(RIIR2h = (Q31R2h = (l - wIR2)1(U3IR2h(R3IR2h, 
(R31R2h = (R21R3h = (Q41R3h = (1 - wIR3)~4(U4IR3h(R4IR3h, and so on. 
This algorithm runs in time polynomial in the length of the numbers involved. 
The following calculation is used later. 
Lemma 1. Suppose R = pq, where p, q are distinct primes in Z[w], 31 NR and 
Nq == 2Np - 1 (mod 9). If(MIRh = 1, then 
M(l/3)(Np-l)·(1/3)(Nq-l) == (Mlp)~2/3)(Np-l) (mod R). 
Proof. Since(MIRh = l,wehave(Mlph·(Mlqh = l,givingthreecasesaccording 
as (Mlph = I, w, or w 2• If, say, (Mlph = w, then 
M(1/3)(Np-l) == w (mod p), 
M(l/3)(Np-l)·(l/3)(Nq-l) == W(l/3)(Nq-l) = W(2/3)(Np-l) (mod pl. 
Also 
M(l/3)(Nq-l) == w 2 (mod q), M(1/3)(Np-l)·(l/3)(Nq-l) == W(2/3)(Np-l) (mod q). 
Combining these two assertions gives the required congruence modulo pq. The 
other two cases are done similarly. 0 
We use the cubic residue symbol to separate the cube roots modulo R in Z[w]. 
For this purpose, it is necessary to make some assumptions on R. If p is a primary 
prime in Z[w] and Np =1= 1 (mod 9), then (wlph :F 1 and so the three cube roots of 
1X3 modulo p, namely IX, WIX, and W21X, give different values of the cubic residue symbol 
(·Iph. We can therefore define the principal cube root IX of 1X3 modulo p to be the 
choice with (1Xlph = 1. 
Now suppose R = pq, where p and q are primary primes in Z[w] and Np, Nq =1= 1 
(mod 9). As explained above a cube, <53 say, has nine cube roots modulo pq. We 
choose the principal cube root [IX, P] as follows: IX is the principal cube root of <5 3 
modulo p and p is the principal cube root of <53 modulo q. The nine cube roots of 
<53 modulo R are given by <5 = [UIX, vP], where U and v run through the cube roots 
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of unity. Note that 
(blRh = (ulph(vlqh = U(1/3)(Np-1)V(1/3)(NQ-1), 
so we can split the nine roots into three types each containing three of the roots as 
follows: we say b has type 1,2, or 3 according as (blRh = 1, w, or w2• Note that the 
type can be determined without factorizing R since it only depends on the value of 
the cubic residue symbol. 
Suppose, in addition, that N p ¢ N q (mod 9). After interchanging p and q if 
necessary, we may suppose that N p == 7 (mod 9) and N q == 4 (mod 9). Now it is easy 
to check that the nine cube roots of b3 modulo pq are grouped as follows: 
type 1: b1 = [a, /1], b2 = [wa, w/1] = Wb 1 , b3 = [w 2a,w2 /1] = W2blo 
type 2: b4 = [IX, w/1], bs = [w2 1X, /1] = W 2b4 • b3 = [wa, w2 /1] = wb4 , 
type 3: b7 = [wa, /1], b8 = [a, w2 /1] = W2b7 , b9 = [w 2a, w/1] = Wb 7 • 
(Here, b1 is the principal cube root.) 
There is a number w in Z[w] such that (wlRh i= 1. Multiplying by w changes the 
type. For definiteness, we investigate the case p == 8 + 6w (mod 9) and q == 5 + 6w 
(mod 9) for which (1 - wlRh = w. (The last assertion follows from the first part of 
the cubic reciprocity law.) In this case, if X has type t, then (1 - w)X has type (t + 1) 
(mod 3» and (1 - W)2 X has type (t + 2) (mod 3). Other choices for p and q modulo 
9 can be handled with minor modifications. 
3. The Message Space 
In what follows, we suppose R = pq, where p, q are primary primes in Z[w], 
p == 8 + 6w (mod 9), and q == 5 + 6w (mod 9). 
A complete set of residues modulo R, or a fundamental region, is a set A such that 
each element of the lattice Z[w] is congruent modulo R to exactly one element of 
A. We take A to be the parallelogram with vertices 0, R, (1 + w)R, and wR, including 
the lattice points on the sides joining 0 to Rand 0 to wR, but not the endpoints R 
and wR, nor the lattice points on the other two sides. (See Fig. 1.) In the figure, wA 
and w2 A are respectively obtained by rotating A through 2n/3 and 4n/3 anticlock-








144 J. H. Loxton, D. S. P. Khoo, G. J. Bird, and J. Seberry 
R R R 
wR wR 
t= 1 t=2 t=3 
Fig. 2 
wise and H is the hexagon H = A u wA U w 2 A obtained by taking the union of A, 
wA, and w 2 A and deleting all the lattice points for which arg z/R is an integral 
multiple of n/3. 
Given a message M in Z[w], we first form Ml = (1 - w)M + 1 to ensure that 
M I is not divisible by 1 - w. Suppose M 1 has type t, that is (M llRh = wt-l with 
t = t, 2, or 3. The first stage in the encryption is given by 
E1(M)=(1-W)4- IM 1 
which yields an element of type 1. 
Definition. The message space A is the set of all messages M in the fundamental 
region A such that E 1(M) is in H. 
Note that multiplying X by 1 - w corresponds to rotating X through n/6 
clockwise and multiplying the magnitude of X by J3. If M is in the message space, 
then E I (M) must be in the appropriate parallelogram shaded in Fig. 2. The three 
cases are distinguished by the value of t, the type of MIas above. Thus, ignoring 
points close to the boundary of A, M must lie in ~A in the case t = 1 (since 
I E I (M)I ~ 91 MI in this case), in i-A in the case t = 2 (since lEI (M)I ~ 3J3IMI and 
E1(M) lies in a rhombus of side !J3IRI and similar to A), and in!A in the case 
t = 3 (since IE 1(M)1 ~ 31M!). The type is uniformly distributed between its three 
possible values in each of these three regions. So the size of the message space is 
asymptotically 
Note that the number of lattice points close to the boundary of A is proportional 
to the length of the boundary, so is O(IRI), while the total number oflattice points 
in A is IAI = NR = IRI2. 
4. Encryption and ~D 
As before, let R = pq, where p, q are primary primes in Z[w], p == 8 + 6w (mod 9) 
andq == 5 + 6w(mod 9). Notethat<p(R) = (Np - l)(Nq - l)is an even integer and 
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congruent to 18 modulo 27. Let h be a rational integer such that (h, q>(R» = 1. The 
encryption exponent is e = 3h; note that e == 3 (mod 6). 
Encryption. Let M be a message in A and set M 1 = (1 - w)M + 1. We assu~e 
that M 1 is relatively prime to R. To effect encryption, first calculate 
N = E1(M) = (l - W)4- IM 1, where (M1IRh = W
,
- 1 (t = 1,2, or 3). 
Then determine E2(N) to be the point in the fundamental region A satisfying 
E2(N) == N e (mod R). 
To summarize, for a plaintext M in A, the ciphertext C is given by 
C = E(M) = Ez(E1(M». 
Decryption. Decryption is also the result of two steps. The decryption exponent 
d is obtained by solving the congruence 
hd == !(1 + !q>(R» (mod q>(R». 
The first decryption stage is to determine D2(C) to be the point in the fundamental 
region A satisfying 
D 2(C) == C' (mod R). 
Lemma 2 below shows that Dz is almost the inverse of E2 • 
We proceed to the second stage of the decryption process. Given X in A with 
X :F 0 and arg XIR :F 'Tt/3, there is a unique point Y = F(X), say, in H C, the closure 
of H, such that Y == X (mod R) and 1 - wi y. In fact, if 0::::;; arg XIR < 'Tt/3, there 
are three points in H C which are congruent to X modulo R, namely X, X - R, and 
X - W Z R, and these three points form a complete set of residues modulo 1 - w. 
Exactly one of them is divisible by 1 - w. If 'Tt/3 < arg XIR ::::;; 2'Tt/3, the same 
argument applies to the points X, X - wR, and X - w2R. Now let (1 - wf be the 
exact power of 1 - w dividing Y and choose Z = G(Y), say, to be that one of Y, w Y, 
or w2 Y such that 
Set 
(5 - 3)'Tt 
6 
The decrypted text obtained from the ciphertext C is 
D(C) = D1(Dz(C», 
provided this is defined (that is, C :F 0 and arg D2(C) :F 'Tt/3). 
It remains to verify the asserti~de above and to confirm that D2 is essentially 
the inverse of Ez (Lemma 2) and that D is the inverse of E (Theorem 1). 
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Lemma 1. Suppose R = pq where p and q are distinct primes in Z(ro], Np == 7 
(mod 9) and N q == 4 (mod 9). If (N I Rh = 1, then 
D2E2(N) = E2D2(N) == N(Nlp)~ (mod R). 
Moreover, if (K, R) = 1, then 
E2D2E2(K) = E2(K). 
Proof. Suppose (NIRh = 1. By Lemma 1, 
X (say) = D2E2(N) = E2D2(N) == Ned == N 1+".R.)!9 == N(Nlp)~ (mod R). 
Next, suppose K is relatively prime to R. Let N be a cube root of K3 of type 1, that 
is N 3 == K3 (mod R) and (NIRh = 1. Then 
E2(N) == N 3h == K3h == E2(K) (mod R) 
and so, by the first part, 
E2D2E2(K) == E2D2E2(N) == E2(N(Nlpln == N311 == E2(K) (mod R). 
However, E2(K) and E2D2E2(K) both lie in the fundamental region A, so they are 
~~~~ 0 
The next theorem confirms that decryption is the inverse of encryption. 
Theorem t. If M is in A and M 1 = (1 - w)M + 1 is relatively prime to R, then 
D(E(M» = D1D2E2E1(M) = D1 E2D2E1(M) = M. 
Proof. Suppose M is in A. Then N = E1(M) is in H, 1 - wiN, and (NIRh = 1. By 
Lemma 2, 
X (say) = D2E2(N) = E2D2(N) == N(Nlp)~ (mod R). 
Since X is in A, N is in H, and 1 - wiN, it follows that F(X) = N(Nlp)~. Suppose 
M 1 = (1 - w)M + 1 has type t, so that N lies in the corresponding shaded paral-
lelogram of Fig. 2. The preceding definitions yield G(F(X» = N and so Dl (X) = M. 
This proves the theorem. 0 
Example. It may be helpful to give an example with "small" numbers to illustrate 
the construction of this section. Take the modulus R = 41 + 12w and encryption 
exponent e = 3. Then R = - pq, where p = - 1 + 6w and q = 5 + 6w are primary 
primes in the prescribed residue classes modulo 9. Take the message M = 1 + 2w, 
so that M 1 = 4 + 3w and M is in the message space and we have (M l' R) = 1. We 
follow through the coding and decoding algorithms, using the notation of this 
section. By the definition of the cubic residue symbol and the law of cubic reciprocity, 
we can compute 
(4 + 3wlph = w2, (4 + 3wlqh~and (4 + 3wlRh = 1, 
so we have N = (1 - W)3 M 1 = 6 - 15ro and the CIphertext is C (== N 3 (mod R» = 
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11 - 13co. The decryption exponent is d = 47 and, by Lemma 2, the first stage of 
the decoding gives 
X = D2(C)( == N(Nlp)~ (mod R» = 15-+ 21co = -(1 - CO)l( - 3 + co) .. 
Since (l - co)lIlX, we set Y = X = 15 + 21co and Z = co2 y = 6 - 15co = 
(1 - co)l(4 + 3co). Finally, Dl (X) = 1 + 2m which returns the original message M. 
5. Factorization and Decryption 
The security of an RSA scheme depends on the difficulty of factorizing the modulus 
of the system. Certainly, if R is factorized, then <p(R) is easy to compute and the 
decryption procedure of Section 4 runs in polynomial time, that is O(1og N R) 
multiprecision operations. For general RSA schemes, it is not known whether there 
is a method for breaking the code which is easier than factorizing the modulus. 
However, we shall establish the equivalence of factorizing the modulus Rand 
decrypting the modified RSA scheme of Section 4. This statement is made precise 
in Theorem 2 below. 
The factorization algorithm is based on the observation that if we can find two 
cube roots, X and Y say, of the same number modulo R, but of di1Terent types, then 
we have 
(X - Y)(X - coY)(X - co2 Y) = Xl - yl == 0, X =1= Y,X =1= coY,X =1= co2 Y(mod R) 
and so one of the greatest common divisors (X - co' Y, R) gives a nontrivial factor 
ofR. 
Let 'II = {C: C = E(M) for some Min A} be the spaceofciphertexts. A decryption 
procedure D* is a function defined on 'II such that D* E(M) = M for each M in A. 
Theorem 2. Suppose D* is a decryption procedure for the encryption scheme of 
Section 4. Then there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm for factorizing R 
requiring on average a bounded number of applications of D*. 
Proof. First, we describe the inverses of the functions Eland D 1 defined in Section 
4. Suppose N = El (M) with M in A. If(1 - coy is the exact power of 1 - co dividing 
N, then 
-1 1 (N ) M=E1 (N)=-- -1 . 1 - co (1 - coy 
Next, suppose M = D 1 (X) is in A and set N = E 1 (M) so that N is in H. By Theorem 
1 and the calculation of Lemma 2, 
X = D2 E2(N) == N, coN, or co2N (mod R). 
The exact power of 1 - co dividing N is 4 - t where t is the type of (1 - co)M + 1. 
Set Z = (1 - cot-'«1 - co)M + 1). Then determine Y = Z, coZ, or co2Z by the 
condition that 1 - col Y and determine X in A so that X == Y (mod R). With this 
construction, X = Dll(M) for M in A. Note that Y is uniquely defined because 
Y = N, coN, or co2 N is in H. 
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Let <I> = {N: N = E1(M)forsome M inA}. We now have the functions E2 : <I> -+ 'P 
and D2 = Dli D*: 'P -+ <I> and from the proof of Theorem 1, 
D2 E2(N) == N, wN, or w2N 
for N in <1>. 
Suppose that we can find K such that(K, R) = 1 and (KIRh '" 1 and X = E 2(K) == 
Ke (mod R) is in 'P. Set N = D 2(X), so that N is in <I> and, in particular, (NIRh = 1. 
Moreover, by Lemma 2, E2(N) = E2 (K). Since (h, q>(R» = 1, there is a unique Win 
A such that W h == X (mod R). Now, N 3", K 3", and W" are all congruent to X modulo 
R. Thus Nand K are cube roots of W of different types and the remark at the 
beginning of this section can be used to obtain the factorization of R. 
We find K with the properties listed above by trial and error. The sets A, <1>, and 
'P have the same number of elements and this number is asymptotic to (49/972)N R. 
Consider X in 'P. There is a unique W such that W h == X (mod R) and there are 
nine choices of K satisfying K3 == W (mod R). Of these, six have (K I Rh '" 1. So the 
number of K with the properties required above is asymptotically (294/972)N R. On 
the average, the number of trials needed to find a suitable K is 972/294 ~ 3·3. D 
Theorem 2 relies on an oracle D* which decrypts all ciphertexts. This is actually 
more than we need. Suppose that the oracle D* only decrypts a certain fraction 1/1-1 
ofthe ciphertexts in 'P. Then we need to choose K above so that E 2 (K) is an element 
of'P which can be decrypted by D*. The number of K with this additional property 
is asymptotically (294/972).p-1 N R. The expected number of applications of D* in 
the algorithm is now (972/294)1/1. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The main result of this paper is comparable to that of Williams in [Wi2]. The 
approach used is a natural extension of the method of Williams [Wit] concerned 
with the encryption function M -+ M2 (mod R). Both here and in [Wi2], the basic 
problem to be solved is to distinguish the cube roots of a number modulo R so that 
a ciphertext can be correctly decoded. In the present paper this is done by restricting 
the message space and giving an algorithm to find the distinguished cube root 
corresponding to a valid message. In [Wi2] the idea is to transmit additional 
information with the ciphertext, namely the values of certain cubic residue symbols, 
in order that the ciphertext can be correctly decoded. There is another technical 
difference in that [Wi2] uses the rational integers {O, 1, 2, ... , N R - I} as the 
complete set of residues modulo R. It seems to us that the geometrical flavour of 
the specification used in this paper shows more promise for an extension to higher 
exponents such as e = 5. (However, we have not carried this through.) 
With a minor modification of the usual method, the encryption scheme of Section 
4 allows users to sign their messages. Suppose A has the encryption map EA = E1 E1 
and decryption map D A = Dt D1 and B has similarly encryption map EB and 
decryption map DB. If A wishes to sign and encrypt a message M, A computes the 
signed message S = D1 E1(M) and sends the ciphertext C = EB(S) to B. On receiving 
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C, B decrypts it by calculating DB(C) = S and then confirms that A is the sender 
of the message by computing DtE1(S) = DtE1D1Et(M) = M. (The algebra relies 
on the second part of Theorem 1.) 
We have proved that decrypting the RSA scheme of this paper and factorizing 
the modulus are computationally equivalent. However, there may still be certain 
messages which can be decoded easily. This is certainly the case if, for example, 
E(M) = M. This leads to the important notion of concealability. 
A cryptosystem is called totally concealable if there is no message M such that 
E(M) = M. The concealment of the RSA cryptosystem is studied in [BB] and the 
cryptosystem of [Wit] is analysed in [KL]. Consider the case e = 3 of the present 
paper where E(M) == {(1 - (0)4-'((1 - £O)M + 1)P (mod R) and t = 1,2, or 3. Set 
M 1 = (1 - £O)M + 1. The equation E(M) = M is equivalent to 
M3 - M 1 - 1 ( d R) 
1 = (1 _ £O)3s+1 mo , 
where s = 1,2, or 3. By the Chinese remainder theorem, M 1 satisfies this congruence 
modulo R if and only if it satisfies the congruence simultaneously with the 
moduli p and q. In these latter cases, where we are working over a field, the 
solutions are given by Cardan's formula, as follows. The equation has the shape 
x 3 + px + q = 0 with p = -(1 - £O)-3S-1 and q = (1 - £O)-3s-1. Define the dis-· 
criminant d ~3 - 27q2 and the resolvents e = { -¥q + !J - 3d p/3 and '7 = 
{-¥q -1y' _3d}1/3, where the two cube roots are chosen so that e'7 = -3p. 
There are three choices for the pair (e, '7) and, correspondingly, three roots x = 
tee + '7) of the equation (See pp. 187-189 of [Wa].) If - 3A is a square modulo p 
and q and the quantities -¥q ± 1J -3A are cubes modulo p and q, then there 
are nine unconcealed messages M with E(M) = M. By the laws of quadratic and 
cubic reciprocity, all these conditions are satisfied for primes lying in certain 
complete arithmetical progressions. If - 3.1 is a square modulo p and q and at least 
one of the quantities -¥q ± 1J - 3d is not a cube modulo p or q, then there are 
no unconcealed messages. This implies that the cryptosystem is totally concealable 
for all the primes lying in certain complete arithmetical progressions. (The situation 
is more complicated if - 3d is not a square.) 
Rivest has pointed out that any cryptosystem in which there is a constructive 
proof of the equivalence of factorization and the breaking of the cipher will be, 
vulnerable to a chosen ciphertext attack. (See [Wi 1].) Suppose B wishes to compro-
mise the security of A's system. As in the proof of Theorem 2, B chooses K such 
that (KIRh =F 1 and sends X = E1(K) to A. To decrypt the message, A computes 
N = D1(X) and M = Dt(N). If B can obtain M from A, then B can break A's system 
because B knows both K and N = Et(M). As noted in the proof of Theorem 2, these 
are cube roots of the same number and of different types and (N - £OiK, R) is a 
nontrivial factor of R for i = 0, 1, or 2. In general, B may have difficulty in persuading 
A to reveal M~owever, if this scheme is used as a key exchange protocol, then A 
would return E (M) to B, so enabling B to compute the key M = DBEB(M). 
The scheme f this paper works, in particular, with exponent e = 3. However, 
there is a wea ness in using an RSA cryptosystem with a fixed small encryption 
exponent e. Suppose the same message M is sent to at least 3e receivers, the jth 
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receiver having public encryption modulus R j , and M lies in each of the corre-
sponding message spaces. The type of M 1 = (1 - w)M + 1 will depend on i, in' 
general, but it has only three possible values. We can therefore pick out e of the 
receivers for which M 1 has the same type. Consider only these e receivers and 
renumber them 1 to e. The ciphertext sent to the ith ofthese receivers is then Cj == Ne 
(mod R j ) where N = E 1 (M) is independent of i. If, as is likely, the R j are relatively 
prime, then we can use the Chinese remainder theorem to find N* such that 
N* == Ne (mod R1Rz '" Re) 
and IN*I < IR1Rz'" Rei. Since N lies in the fundamental hexagon modulo R j , we 
have INI < IRjl for each i and so Ne < R1Rz '" Re. Therefore, N* = Ne and N = 
(N*)l/e is revealed without the factorization of the moduli. To counter this attack, 
it is necessary to take a relatively large value of e as envisaged in the discussion of 
this paper. 
While our discussion is mainly oftheoretical interest, there is no serious difficulty 
in implementing the encryption and decryption procedures. Arithmetic in Z [w] is 
easy because this ring is a Euclidean domain and the various algorithms required 
are implicit in the descriptions we have given. 
References 
[BB] G. R. Blakley and I. Borosh. Rivest-Shamir-Adelman public key cryptosystem do not always 
conceal massages. Comput. Math. Appl. 5 (1979).169-178. 
[IR] K. Ireland and M. Rosen. A Classical Introduction to Modern Number Theory. Springer-Verlag. 
New York. 1982. 
[KL] S. Kothari and S. Lakshmivarahan, On the concealability of messages by the Williams public-key 
encryption scheme. Comput. Math. Appl. 10 (1984).15-24. 
[R] M. O. Rabin. Digitized signatures and public-key functions as intractable as factorization. 
Technical Report LCS{fR-212. M.I.T. Laboratory for Computer Science. 1979. 
[Wa] B. L. van der Waerden. Algebra. vol. 1. Ungar. New York. 1970. 
[Wil] H. C. Williams. A modification of the RSA public-key procedure. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 
26 (1980). 726-729. 
[Wi2] H. C. Williams. An MJ public-key encryption scheme. Advances in Cryptology. CR Y PTO '85. 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. vol. 218. Springer-Verlag. Berlin. pp. 358-368. 
